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The few studies investigating partners’ response behavior in strategic alliances often fail to
provide empirical support for a large proportion of the relationships they hypothesized. This
discrepancy between theory and empirical findings could be attributed to a misconceptuali-
zation of response strategies as independent from each other. Indeed, response strategies
could be better conceptualized as a circumplex structure rather than as discrete responses.
Whereas the circumplex structure of response strategies has been empirically established, it
has not yet been taken into account when detecting the effects of potential antecedents on
response strategies. A model that accounts for the circumplex structure thus should exhibit
superior explanatory power by reducing Type II error. PLS path modeling is particularly suited
to substantiate the superiority of such a model, however PLS path modeling as implemented
in extant software is not equipped to estimate circumplex structures. Therefore, the objective
of the present study is twofold. First, we extend PLS path modeling so that it can handle cir-
cumplex structures. Second, building on a circumplex structure of response strategies, we
develop and test a model of alliance partners’ response strategies and key antecedents. The
results of a survey of alliance managers corroborate our expectations and demonstrate that
non-significant antecedents become significantwhenaccounting for the circumplex structure.
This study thus advances PLS path modeling and contributes to a better understanding of
managers’ complex decision-making processes in strategic alliances.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
In recent decades, strategic alliances have become cornerstones of many firms’ competitive strategies
(Kale and Singh, 2009). These alliances are defined as long-term, non-equity, cooperative arrange-
ments that partners use to achieve objectives they could not otherwise reach (Das and Teng, 2000).0024-6301/$ - see front matter  2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2012.10.003
Strategic alliances are also mixed-motive ventures, in which partners simultaneously cooperate and
compete (Kumar and Nti, 2004). Because of this internal rivalry, alliances often tend to result in pre-
mature terminations. A high failure rate of between 60 and 70 percent (Hughes and Weiss, 2007)
highlights the need for alliance managers to anticipate their partners’ behavior (Tjemkes and
Furrer, 2010), as this behavior may be destructive to the alliance (Hibbard et al., 2001). Underper-
formance and unintended dissolutionmight be avoided if managers are able to respond to early warn-
ing signals (Ari~no and Doz, 2000). But, despite a vast amount of scholarly work on alliance
governance, there has been little research on partners’ response behaviors and how they might be
predicted.
Prior studies investigating response behavior in strategic alliances have adopted and extended the
exit, voice, loyalty and neglect (EVLN) typology (e.g., Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard
et al., 2001; Ping, 1993). These studies conceptualize response strategies as discrete and organize
them in a passiveeactive and constructiveedestructive two-dimensional space (Furrer et al.,
2012). Some studies started to investigate the effect of antecedents, such as economic and social
satisfaction, on each response strategy (e.g., Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). Although they contribute
to a better understanding of response behavior, these studies often fail to provide empirical support
for a large proportion of the relationships they hypothesize. Ping (1993) for example reports seven
non-significant effects out of 15 hypothesized relationships, and Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) find 14
non-significant effects out of 28 hypothesized relationships. This discrepancy between theory and
empirical findings could be attributed to a misconceptualization of response strategies as indepen-
dent from one another.
Furrer et al. (2012) thus suggest that response strategies should be conceptualized as a circumplex
structure rather than discrete responses. Whereas a circumplex structure, akin to a discrete model,
builds on a two-dimensional space, it also stipulates the order of response strategies along the cir-
cumference of a circle on the basis of their degree of compatibility (Fabrigar et al., 1997). A key
property of such a structure is its continuous nature (Schwartz, 2012), which allows for non-
measured interstitial responses (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). A continuous structure also implies
that antecedents might be related to the whole structure, without showing significant effects on
any discrete response strategy or any of the two dimensions of the response strategy space. Thus,
prior studies conceptualizing response strategies as discrete might have been misled by statistical
tests and falsely rejected hypotheses (Brock, 2003). A model that accounts for the circumplex struc-
ture of response strategies may exhibit superior explanatory power, by reducing Type II error, but
to date such a model has not been empirically validated. Whereas the circumplex structure of re-
sponse strategies has been established (Furrer et al., 2012), the continuous nature of the circumplex
structure has not been taken into account for detecting the effects of potential antecedents on re-
sponse strategies.
To substantiate this superior explanatory power of a model that accounts for the circumplex
structure of response strategies, we consider partial least squares (PLS) path modeling particularly
well suited. As a variance-based technique, it aims to maximize the explained variance of the model
(Reinartz et al., 2009). Even with a high number of parameters, as required for estimating a circum-
plex structure, it allows for smaller sample sizes than traditional structural modeling techniques
(Chin and Newsted, 1999; Hair et al., 2012). Furthermore, PLS does not rely on distributional as-
sumptions, which becomes relevant in the presence of heavily right-skewed variables, such as some
of the response strategies (Cassel et al., 1999). However, PLS path modeling as implemented in ex-
tant PLS software is not equipped to estimate circumplex models. In particular, it does not permit
modeling the continuous two-dimensional nature of a circumplex structure.
Thus, the objective of the present study is twofold. First, we extend PLS path modeling so that it
can handle circumplex structures. We estimate a hierarchical component model and apply deflation
(Lohm€oller, 1989) to extract two dimensions that span the response strategies in a circumplex
structure. We enhance PLS path modeling so that it can control the component rotation during
its runtime. Specifically, by arbitrarily fixing the position of one response strategy, we can align
the two dimensions of the circumplex structure with the response strategies. In turn, thisLong Range Planning, vol 45 2012 425
enhancement enables us to express the effects of potential antecedents in polar coordinates, which is
necessary to specify the test of the antecedents on the circumplex structure correctly. We also apply
bootstrapping in a novel way to determine confidence regions for the effects of antecedent variables.
This enhancement of PLS path modeling can help reduce Type II error in assessing the effects of
antecedents on circumplex systems of dependent variables.
Second, building on the circumplex structure of response strategies, we develop and test a model of
alliance partners’ response strategies and key antecedents. To increase the explanatory power of the
model and better represent the actual decision-making context of strategic alliances (Hennart, 2006),
we present a circumplex structure of seven response strategies (i.e., exit, opportunism, aggressive voice,
creative voice, considerate voice, patience, neglect) and identify antecedents of these response strategies
at three different levels of analysis: individual, alliance and environment. That is, we hypothesize direct
effects of individual, alliance and environmental factors, and a moderating effect of environmental fac-
tors on the circumplex structure of response strategies. The results of a survey of alliance managers cor-
roborate the circumplex structure of response strategies and demonstrate that previously discarded
antecedents actually have significant effects on response strategies if we adopt the circumplex structure.
The managerial implications derived from the findings show that managers account for the in-
tegrated structure of response strategies when making decisions and consider influential factors at
the individual, alliance and environmental levels of analysis. They perform this assessment rather
than choosing a response strategy in piecemeal fashion based solely on alliance-level factors, as im-
plied by previous studies. This study’s insights help managers better anticipate the response behav-
ior of their alliance partners and thus contribute to a clearer understanding of managers’ complex
decision-making processes in strategic alliances.
In the next section, we review response strategy literature and then develop a model of response
strategies. After we present the method used to empirically assess the model, we detail our results.
Finally, we conclude this article with a discussion of the methodological, theoretical, and manage-
rial implications and limitations.
A model of response strategies in strategic alliances
Seven response strategies
A response strategy is a manager’s intended reaction to relationship dissatisfaction (Tjemkes and
Furrer, 2010; Tjemkes et al., 2012). Hirschman (1970) proposed a framework in which exit, voice
and loyalty represent three alternative response strategies organized along a constructiveedestructive
dimension. Farrell (1983) extended this framework with neglect and a second passiveeactive dimen-
sion, proposing the EVLN (exit-voice-loyalty-neglect) typology. Later studies distinguished three
types of voice: considerate, creative and aggressive (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Tjemkes and Furrer,
2010; Zhou and George, 2001), which vary according to their degree of activeness and constructive-
ness. Opportunism also joined the typology (Ping, 1993), as an activeedestructive strategy.
Exit refers to the termination of an alliance and is the most destructive response (Rusbult et al.,
1982). It also constitutes a marginally active response (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Tjemkes et al., 2012).
Opportunism is an activeedestructive response (Wathne and Heide, 2000) to increase benefits from
the alliance in ways that are prohibited in the alliance contract (Ping, 1993). Considerate voice is an
activeeconstructive response to improve the alliance relationship by communicating in a relation-
ship-preserving manner and cooperatively discussing problems with one’s partner (Hagedoorn
et al., 1999; Ping, 1993). Compared to considerate voice, aggressive voice is more activeedestructive.
It is the forceful imposition of views on partners without making any attempt to avoid conflicts
(Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Hibbard et al., 2001). Creative voice is the generation of innovative and
potentially useful solutions to solve issues in the alliance relationship (Zhou and George, 2001).
This makes it constructive and more active than considerate voice (Furrer et al., 2012). Patience
is the response strategy of a partner silently accepting the issues in the belief that the alliance
will improve in the future (Ping, 1993). Patience is passiveeconstructive because it involves volun-
tarily ignoring the issue in the hope that the situation will resolve itself. Finally, neglect is426 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
passiveedestructive because it allows the alliance relationship to deteriorate (Farrell, 1983; Rusbult
et al., 1982). Neglect is based on the belief that the alliance does not deserve to be salvaged, so little
effort is spent to keep it afloat (Ping, 1993).
The circumplex structure of response strategies
Building on the passiveeactive and constructiveedestructive two-dimensional space, Furrer et al.
(2012) empirically demonstrated that a circumplex structure best represents the interrelationships
among response strategies. A circumplex structure organizes response strategies along the circum-
ference of a circle on the basis of the degree of compatibility and incompatibility (Fabrigar et al.,
1997). For example, aggressive voice and opportunism are both activeedestructive, so are compat-
ible and located close to each other on the circle. By comparison, neglect (passiveedestructive) and
creative voice (activeeconstructive) are incompatible, so are located opposite each other. Figure 1
depicts the response strategies circumplex structure.
As mentioned in the introduction, a key property of a circumplex structure is that it is contin-
uous (Schwartz, 2012) and could account for additional unmeasured response strategies that blend
the existing strategies (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). There could be unmeasured strategies between any
pair of response strategies (Furrer et al., 2012). An important implication of such a continuous
structure is that there may be antecedents that are related to unmeasured interstitial response with-
out showing a significant effect on any measured response strategy or any of the two dimensions of
the response strategy space. Therefore, modeling response strategies as a circumplex structure en-
ables detection of effects that would be difficult to observe when using a discrete model of response
strategies. Thus, it allows for a better prediction of response strategies by reducing Type II error.
Response strategy antecedents
Akin to previous alliance response strategy studies (e.g., Ping, 1993), we adopt a one-sided perspective
on the relationship (Kumar et al., 1993) focusing on one partner’s response behavior. Based on this
perspective, we develop a model explaining an alliance manager’s response preference (see Figure 2).
More specifically, we formulate hypotheses specifying relationships between three sets of
antecedentseindividual, alliance and environmental factorseand the degree of passivenesseactiveness
and constructivenessedestructiveness of response strategies, while accounting for the circumplex
structure.Figure 1. The theoretical circumplex structure of response strategies
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Managers are bounded in their rationality, and their decisions are based on heuristics and cues,
partly influenced by their experience (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Their cognitive bases and
values filter and distort their perceptions, and thereby affect decision-making (Pansiri, 2005).
Thus, at the individual level, alliance manager characteristics are likely to constitute an antecedent
of response strategy preference. In this study, we focus on one such critical personal characteristic,
a manager’s experience with strategic alliances (Tjemkes et al., 2012). This is because personal and
demographic characteristics, such as functional background and cultural values, are embedded in
a manager’s experience (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Alliance experience refers to a manager’s know-how obtained through past alliance engage-
ments (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Experience may be built up through hands-on manage-
ment of multiple relationships, participating in alliance communities, and having received
alliance training and education (Parise and Sasson, 2002). For example, communities of practice
enhance managers’ intellectual capital, which they can leverage. Similarly, training and education
enables managers to learn from other managers’ experiences. Managers’ alliance experience in-
creases their comprehension of the complexities inherently tied to the management of strategic
alliances. Pekar and Allio (1994) showed that, compared to inexperienced managers, experienced
alliance managers are better able to identify business risks, develop feasible business plans, link
resources to strategic priorities, conduct resource planning, and couple incentives and perfor-
mance metrics. Moreover, experienced alliance managers are better capable to address difficulties
should they arise. They recognize adverse situations in a timely manner and implement initiatives
to steer the alliance away from premature termination (Pekar and Allio, 1994). That is, building
on their experience they are likely to use activeeconstructive responses to avoid conflict,
and quickly identify and competently resolve problematic alliance situations. In contrast, man-
agers with little experience are likely to be unable to deal with emerging tensions and default
to passiveedestructive responses:
Hypothesis 1: A manager’s alliance experience positively influences his/her preference for
activeeconstructive responses.428 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
Alliance-level factors: exchange conditions
Building on social exchange and interdependence theories, prior response strategy research
(Rusbult and Farrell, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1988) proposed that response strategies are influenced
by relationship- or alliance-level factors. In line with prior alliance studies (Geyskens and
Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010), we focus on four alliance-level factors,
economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, exit barriers, and availability of alternatives, which have
been identified to affect managers’ preference for certain response strategies.
Economic satisfaction pertains to evaluation of the strategic alliance’s financial outcomes
(Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Economically satisfied managers prefer activeeconstructive re-
sponses because good financial performance increases partners’ commitment to the alliance (Olk
and Young, 1997). When economic performance is low, managers are likely to prefer passivee
destructive strategies to escape the underperforming relationship (Brouthers and Bamossy,
2006). Social satisfaction pertains to managers’ evaluations of the psycho-social aspects of the alli-
ance (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Managers who are satisfied with the alliance relationship
tend to appreciate contact with their counterparts and are likely to be more tolerant of problematic
situations. They are more likely to prefer passiveeconstructive response strategies (Hibbard et al.,
2001). Managers who are dissatisfied with the relationship prefer activeedestructive strategies and
would rather attempt to covertly extract benefits or discontinue the relationship than try to save it
(Deeds and Hill, 1998). Exit barriers refer to the costs of exiting a strategic alliance (Ping, 1999). Exit
barriers, such as alliance-specific investments, are likely to trigger active responses and inhibit pas-
sive strategies. Active responses might reduce the risk of losing the investments if the relationship is
prematurely terminated (Ping, 1993). Availability of alternatives pertains to the extent to which
partners possess other options to achieve their objectives. When there is no alternative, managers
have strong incentives to make the current alliance work and are likely to actively respond to im-
prove the situation (Ping, 1999). When a firm has attractive alternatives at hand, the need to pre-
serve existing alliances diminishes, which allows for more passive responses. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: Exchange conditions influence a manager’s response strategy preference such that
(a) economic satisfaction positively influences preference for activeeconstructive responses;
(b) social satisfaction positively influences preference for passiveeconstructive responses; (c) the
presence of exit barriers positively influences preferences for active responses; and (d) the
availability of alternatives positively influences preference for passive responses.Environmental factors: environmental turbulence and competitive pressure
Drawing on industrial organization economics (e.g., Porter, 1980; Scherer and Ross, 1990), alliance
research has shown that the industry environment can exercise direct and moderating effects on
strategic decision-making. As firms establish alliances to respond to the external industry environ-
ment (Paulraj and Chen, 2007), this external environment affects alliance decision-making, includ-
ing response strategies. As suggested by Tjemkes and Furrer (2011), we distinguish between two
environmental factors: environmental turbulence and competitive pressure.
Environmental turbulence pertains to volatility or difficult-to-predict discontinuities in a firm’s
industry (Aldrich, 1979). Turbulent environments are characterized by unpredictability, unexpected
changes, and the absence of patterns (Fynes et al., 2004). In a turbulent industry, firms are more
likely to switch partners to respond to changes (Aldrich, 1979) proactively adapting their resources
to new environmental requirements (Kandemir et al., 2006). In such environments, the conse-
quences of discontinuing an alliance tend to be less severe, thus firms may also be less inclined
to avoid conflict with their alliance partners. They are more likely to prefer activeedestructive re-
sponse strategies. In contrast, stable environments are more predictable and firms have more op-
portunities to exploit their alliance partners’ resources. In such environmental conditions,
alliance partners are likely to prefer response strategies that minimize conflict (Kandemir et al.,
2006), thus it is more likely they will prefer passiveeconstructive strategies.Long Range Planning, vol 45 2012 429
Competitive pressure refers to the degree of rivalry between competitors in an industry. When
firms operate in industries characterized by high competitive pressure, they are under continuous
threat from rivals (Furrer and Thomas, 2000). In such an environment, they are more willing to put
the alliance relationship at risk through passiveedestructive response strategies. For example, firms
are more likely to refrain from investing in their existing alliances in order to save resources to
counter rivals’ moves. In contrast, firms operating under less competitive pressure are likely to pre-
serve the quality of their existing alliances to leverage resources, because they are likely to have de-
veloped a state of mutual forbearance with their rivals (Axelrod, 1986). In such an environment,
firms can improve alliance performance without the risk that competitors’ actions will render
the relationship obsolete. To ensure stable alliance development, they need to secure partner in-
volvement. This suggests preferences for activeeconstructive strategies. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: Environmental factors influence a manager’s response strategy preference such that
(a) environmental turbulence positively influences preference for activeedestructive responses;
and (b) competitive pressure positively influences preferences for passiveedestructive responses.
The industry environment has also been identified as a major contingency in management and
strategy research (Porter, 1980; Scherer and Ross, 1990). More specifically, environmental turbu-
lence and competitive pressure are likely to increase requirements for successful management
(Calantone et al., 2003), as they are likely to interact with individual- and alliance-level factors.
We propose that, in turbulent and competitive environments, managers’ alliance experience is likely
to be more critical than in less turbulent and competitive environments. The more turbulent and
competitive, the environment the more varied and fragmented the nature of alliance managers’
work (Mintzberg, 1973) and the greater the information-processing demand on managers (Daft
et al., 1988). Confronted with such external pressures, alliance experience enables managers to
more efficiently and effectively process information, providing managers with more latitude to en-
gage in activeeconstructive responses. In contrast, in less turbulent and less competitive environ-
ments, alliance experience is likely to be less critical, because inexperienced managers have more
time to analyze and respond to the situation. Thus, environmental turbulence and competitive
pressure strengthen the relationship between alliance experience and response strategy preference.
Consistent with strategic issues categorization theory (Dutton and Jackson, 1987), in turbulent
and competitive environments managers are likely to focus their attention on economic and social
satisfaction, because in such environments any change in these factors is likely to be perceived as
a threat. Managers perceive economic and social dissatisfaction as more critical factors, because ad-
versities need to be dealt with quickly. In contrast, in less turbulent and competitive environments,
economic and social satisfaction constitute less influencing factors, as alliance managers can adopt
a longer-term perspective. Thus, both environmental turbulence and competitive pressure
strengthen the effects of economic and social satisfaction on response strategy preference.
Alternatively, in less turbulent and competitive environments managers are likely to focus their
attention on exit barriers and available alternatives. In such environments, managers consider exit
barriers and the lack of alternatives as threats, thus these factors become more important. In con-
trast, in turbulent and competitive environments, the importance of exit barriers and available al-
ternatives relatively diminishes, as opportunities may become obsolete and future, unforeseen
opportunities may provide managers with new attractive alternatives. This implies that both envi-
ronmental turbulence and competitive pressure weaken the relationship between exit barriers and
available alternatives and response strategy preference. In sum, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 and 5: Environmental turbulence (H4) and competitive pressure (H5) moderate the
relationship between individual and alliance factors and manager’s response strategy preference such
that they (a) strengthen the effect of alliance experience on response strategy preference,
(b) strengthen the effect of economic and social satisfaction on response strategy preference, and
(c) weaken the effect of exit barriers and available alternatives on response strategy preference.430 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
Data and methods
Study setting and procedure
We test the hypotheses in the context of non-equity strategic alliances. As we focus on a manager’s
preference for response strategies, the unit of analysis in the study is an alliance manager responsible
for an alliance. To collect data, we developed an online survey and contacted CEOs of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). Contact details were obtained from a business association. The key
advantage of targeting SME CEOs is that they tend to be directly responsible and/or involved in
the management of their firm’s strategic alliances unlike those of larger firms. This ensures the qual-
ity of the data.
The survey asked respondents to select a non-equity strategic alliance with a clear financial ob-
jective with which they were personally involved. Then, respondents were asked to assess alliance
and environmental factors pertaining to the selected alliance as well as individual and firm charac-
teristics. Finally, we asked them to indicate how they would respond to the current situation in the
selected alliance, rather than reporting on past behavior, to reduce recall and recency bias as well as
social desirability bias.
A link to the survey was sent by e-mail to 1,000 CEOs. One hundred and six valid questionnaires
were returned, for a response rate of 10.6%, which is reasonable for a relatively long online survey
(Deutskens et al., 2004). However, given the relative low response rate, response bias might be
a concern. A comparison of respondents to a group of 36 non-respondents on the basis of firm
size (t ¼ .993, p ¼ .332), number of alliances (t ¼ 1.368, p ¼ .174), and manager’s age
(t ¼ 1.245, p ¼ .220) indicated no significant differences. Thus, response bias poses a limited con-
cern in this study.
On average, respondents’ firms had 433 employees (standard deviation [SD] ¼ 1146.41), and
were currently participating in 7.9 alliances (SD ¼ 8.8). The respondents were mostly male
(72.6%), 43.4 years old (SD ¼ 10.6), and had moderate experience with alliances (4.06 on
a seven-point scale, SD ¼ 1.88). The respondents worked for firms operating in business services
(49), non-profit sectors (26), production/manufacturing (18), and other industries (13). We con-
trolled for type of sector when we estimated the PLS models, but the results were not significant.
Measures
Response strategies
We use the scales developed and validated by Tjemkes and Furrer (2010). Appendix A presents the
complete list of items. Exit was measured with items related to whether the respondent intended to
end the relationship or stop doing business with the alliance partner. Measures for opportunism
included: withholding information, exaggerating the severity of the situation, and escaping from
contractual obligations. Aggressive voice referred to pushing the firm’s solution on its partner,
and being persistent. Creative voice referred to generating novel and creative solutions. Considerate
voice items included: working to create a consensus, and finding a satisfactory solution acceptable
for both partners. Patience was measured with items including: waiting for better times, and trust-
ing that the situation would resolve itself. The items for neglect included: not dealing with the issue,
not putting additional effort into the relationship, and not presenting initiatives to improve the sit-
uation. All constructs were operationalized by reflective multi-item measures using seven-point
scales, ranging from “I would definitely not react in this way” (1) to “I would definitely react in
this way” (7).
Individual factor
Alliance experience pertains to a manager’s ability (that is, knowledge and skills) to handle alliance
relationships (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). One item captured alliance experience: “To what ex-
tent do you have experience with alliances?” The indicator used a seven-point scale, ranging from
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Alliance factors
The four exchange variables were measured with existing and validated scales. Economic sat-
isfaction was captured with two items that tapped into respondents’ evaluation of the financial
outcomes of the relationship (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). They examined to what extent
the respondent is satisfied with the financial benefits the alliance generated and the overall al-
liance performance. Social satisfaction was operationalized with two items capturing the
degree to which interactions with the partner are fulfilling, gratifying, and easy (Geyskens
and Steenkamp, 2000). Five items, developed by Ping (1999), were used to capture exit bar-
riers, pertaining to the degree to which the firm could not terminate the alliance without sub-
stantial costs because of investments. The availability of alternatives refers to the extent to
which a partner possesses solutions that could enable managers to attain their firms’ objec-
tives. This was captured with two items (Ping, 1993) measuring the extent to which a firm
possessed alternative options to achieve its strategic objectives. All constructs used seven-
point scales.
Environmental factors
To capture environmental turbulence, we adapted the reflective scale developed by Slater and
Narver (1994). It consists of three items that capture the degree to which respondents perceive
the external environment to be dynamic, consider the firm’s industry to be turbulent, and view
the external environment to be uncertain. Competitive pressure was captured with one item assess-
ing the degree to which the alliance is surrounded by strong and direct competitors. Both constructs
were measured with seven-point scales.
Controls
Prior research indicates that additional variables might also influence strategic alliance decision-
making in general, such as resource complementarity and competition between partners. However,
further theoretical development is needed to relate them to preferences for response strategies and
therefore predictions at this stage are not warranted. Thus, we do not propose specific hypotheses
but control for their potential effects. That is, we controlled for resource complementarity, which
refers to the degree to which the combination of the partner’s resource endowments would result in
synergies (Lambe et al., 2002). We also controlled for whether respondents perceived their partners
as competitors, because an alliance between competitors might be subject to additional tensions
(Kumar and Nti, 2004). In addition, as some response strategies (such as opportunism) may be
less socially desirable than others, the M-C2 version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
scale was also included (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972). We also controlled for managers’ age and
gender.Analysis
We enhance and use PLS path modeling to assess the circumplex structure of response strategies
and to test our hypotheses. Since PLS does not provide a global goodness-of-fit measure
(Henseler and Sarstedt, 2012), we use a three-step procedure to assess the adequacy of the model
(see Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). First, we assess the measurement model with regard to reliabil-
ity, validity, and circumplexity (Furrer et al., 2012). Second, we test the structural model parameters
of the discrete two-dimensional and continuous circumplex models. Third, we compare the explan-
atory power of the two models.
Measurement model
The reliability and validity of the constructs’ measurement was assessed based on Hair et al. (2012)
and Henseler et al.’s (2009) recommendations. Then, we examined the circumplexity of the re-
sponse strategy structure.432 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
Reliability
The internal consistency reliability was estimated using Cronbach’s alpha (a) and J€oreskog’s rho
(rc). The a is typically lower bound to reliability, whereas rc (which relies on PLS’ upwards-
biased construct loadings, see Gefen et al., 2011) overestimates the reliability. Therefore, the true
construct reliability is likely to lie between a and rc. Based on reliability considerations, six indica-
tors were discarded (see Appendix A for the final list of indicators and their standardized loadings).
As Table 1 shows, all constructs exhibited sufficient levels of internal consistency reliability with
a coefficients above .70 (two exceptions with a  .63) and rc coefficients above .80 (see
Nunnally, 1978).
Validity
The validity of the construct measurement was assessed in terms of convergent and discriminant
validity (Hair et al., 2012; Henseler et al., 2009). Convergent validity was assessed using the average
variance extracted (AVE). All AVE values are above the critical value of .50 (Fornell and Larcker,
1981), which indicates that all constructs were unidimensional. Table 1 shows the AVE values
and the construct correlations. A comparison of the squared construct correlation (.48 between eco-
nomic and social satisfaction) with the smallest AVE (.50 of neglect) showed that the Fornell-
Larcker criterion was met. Therefore, discriminant validity can also be confirmed.
Circumplexity
The two passiveeactive and constructiveedestructive dimensions of the structure were modeled
first to assess the circumplex structure of response strategies. An enhanced hierarchical component
model (depicted in Appendix B) was estimated to validate these two dimensions, using the
repeated-indicator approach (Wetzels et al., 2009; Ringle et al., 2012) in combination with the
factor-weighting scheme (Lohm€oller, 1989). We relied on deflation as a sequential estimation ap-
proach (Lohm€oller, 1989), which implied two estimation rounds. The first round estimated the
loadings of the first dimension of response strategies. The second round used the measurement re-
siduals of the first dimension as indicators for the second component. This makes it possible to
identify two orthogonal dimensions.
The hierarchical component model was enhanced by an orthogonal component rotation, includ-
ing sign constraints. The PLS algorithm1 was extended to determine the angle 4 between the first
higher-order dimension and the exit construct. Both higher-order dimensions of response strategies
were then orthogonally rotated using the following rotation matrix:1 W
Core T
by Sma
Long RRe4 ¼

cos4 sin4
esin4 cos4
Moreover, the first higher-order dimension was multiplied with the sign of the correlation with the
exit construct. The second higher-order dimension was multiplied with the sign of the correlation
with the aggressive voice construct. This procedure circumvented sign indeterminacy and ensured
that the first dimension of the response strategy space (constructiveedestructive) was equal to the
exit construct, whereas the second dimension represented the passiveeactive dimension. Table 2
lists the path coefficients of the paths from the two dimensions to the seven response strategies
as polar coordinates. For each response strategy, radius r was obtained as the Euclidean distance
from the originr ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b21þ b22
p
;e programmed this extension as part of an implementation of the PLS path modeling algorithm in R 2.14.1 (R Development
eam, 2011). Results obtained by the R-based implementation of the standard PLS algorithm were equal to results obtained
rtPLS 2.0 M3 (Ringle et al., 2005). The R code is available from the third author upon request.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Construct Items a rc AVE Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Age 1 d d d 1.00
2 Aggressive Voice 4 .75 .84 .57 .06 1.00
3 Availability of
Alternatives
2 .63 .84 .72 .08 .08 1.00
4 Competition
between Partners
1 d d d .21 .11 .10 1.00
5 Competitive
Pressure
1 d d d .06 .02 .12 .33 1.00
6 Considerate
Voice
5 .88 .91 .67 .14 .22 .06 .09 .28 1.00
7 Creative Voice 5 .81 .87 .57 .10 .45 .11 .09 .20 .54 1.00
8 Economic
Satisfaction
2 .84 .92 .86 .09 .05 .19 .07 .07 .35 .32 1.00
9 Environmental
Turbulence
3 .73 .85 .65 .03 .05 .02 .29 .16 .14 .00 .26 1.00
10 Exit 4 .90 .93 .77 .00 .11 .10 .01 .13 .45 .30 .62 .13 1.00
11 Exit Barriers 5 .82 .87 .58 .00 .22 .21 .03 .00 .09 .04 .11 .20 .12 1.00
12 Experience 1 d d d .24 .08 .01 .02 .22 .27 .34 .08 .15 .28 .06 1.00
13 Gender 1 d d d .26 .12 .04 .19 .22 .31 .10 .08 .05 .15 .02 .21 1.00
14 Neglect 4 .66 .80 .50 .00 .12 .03 .03 .29 .45 .36 .36 .02 .53 .07 .19 .07 1.00
15 Opportunism 6 .85 .89 .57 .27 .10 .16 .03 .25 .36 .25 .05 .13 .21 .23 .20 .06 .16 1.00
16 Patience 6 .85 .89 .57 .05 .43 .03 .04 .02 .19 .29 .01 .18 .01 .29 .07 .05 .35 .00 1.00
17 Resource
Complementarity
5 .85 .89 .63 .13 .28 .11 .05 .20 .47 .49 .40 .08 .55 .01 .30 .15 .47 .17 .16 1.00
18 Social Desirability 1 d d d .26 .07 .15 .12 .33 .05 .01 .04 .01 .00 .11 .01 .23 .16 .27 .05 .01 1.00
19 Social Satisfaction 2 .78 .90 .82 .02 .01 .18 .03 .29 .45 .38 .69 .18 .64 .18 .17 .22 .36 .21 .07 .56 .13
Notes: n ¼ 106. Correlations with absolute value greater than .19 are significant at 5%.
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Table 2. Polar coordinates of response strategies, their confidence intervals, and differential angles
r 95%-CI (r) 4 95%-CI (4) D4 95%-CI (D4)
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Exit .778 .584 .945 0  d d 4  98  64 
Opportunism .623 .376 .911 4  262  64  77  44  205 
Aggressive Voice .769 .444 .879 81  57  156  48  9  73 
Creative Voice .786 .691 .887 129  99  182  23  19  51 
Considerate Voice .840 .543 .900 152  122  189  111  91  175 
Patience .855 .596 .937 263  237  321  60  3  90 
Neglect .680 .517 .858 323  291  357  37  3  69 where b1 is the path coefficient from the constructive-destructive dimension and b2 is the path
coefficient from the passive-active dimension. The corresponding angle 4 (0  4 < 360) was ob-
tained by
4 ¼ sgnðb2Þ$

cose1ðb1=rÞe180
þ 180
The 95% confidence intervals for radii and angles were determined by means of bootstrapping with
10,000 bootstrap samples, leading to resampling-based confidence regions (see Obenchain, 1999).
Moreover, bootstrap confidence intervals were obtained for the angle differences (D4) between
neighboring response strategies (see Table 2).
We extended the hierarchical component model with the social desirability measure to control
for social desirability bias. As anticipated, social desirability bias negatively affected opportunism
(b ¼ .177, p< .05), which meant that opportunism would have been more pronounced if respon-
dents had not been prone to social desirability.
The results support the circumplexity of response strategies. First, all radii were significantly different
from zero. The smallest lower bound of a confidence interval of4was found for opportunism (.376). All
confidence intervals of radii shared one subinterval (.691; .849), which is satisfactory (Fabrigar et al.,
1997). Second, six out of seven response strategies are positioned on the circumference of the circle
(i.e. equal radii) with only opportunism deviating from the circumference. Third, the point estimates
are arranged around the origin in the order predicted in Figure 1. Fourth, five out of seven differences
between angles were significantly different from zero. Only opportunism and exit and considerate and
creative voice did not significantly differ from each other. Although these two non-significant differ-
ences in angles did not support the existence of seven distinct strategies, they did not reject the circum-
plex structure of response strategies (Furrer et al., 2012; Schwartz, 2012). Overall, the results provide
evidence for a circumplex structure of response strategies. To corroborate the PLS findings we used
co-variance based structural equation modeling to assess a discrete two-dimensional model and two
circumplexmodels, a fully constrainedmodel and amodel for which we released the equality constraint
for the radius of opportunism. The results confirm the PLS findings (see Appendix C).
Figure 3 summarizes the findings with regard to the circumplexity of response strategies. First, it
shows the point estimates of the seven response strategies. Second, it includes the confidence re-
gions, which are annular sectors (in dotted lines) representing the confidence intervals of angles
and radii. Third, it contains a grey annulus symbolizing the subset of radii that all confidence in-
tervals of response strategy radii have in common.
Structural model results
The model was estimated as depicted in Figure 2. To avoid possible problems of non-convergence,
the factor-weighting scheme was chosen, and the centroid scheme was used for triangulation
(Henseler, 2010). No differences were found. Moreover, 10,000 bootstrap samples were used toLong Range Planning, vol 45 2012 435
Figure 3. The empirical circumplex structure of response strategiesobtain inference statistics. Since nothing is known about the behavior of sign correction mecha-
nisms in the light of a circumplex structure, we did not use sign corrections. Consequently, the re-
sulting inference statistics can be regarded as somewhat conservative.
A hybrid orthogonalizing approach helped analyze moderating effects (Henseler and Chin, 2010;
Henseler et al., 2012). Orthogonalization (also called residuals centering) means that instead of sim-
ply multiplying the interacting variables, the product of the interacting variables is regressed on the
two original variables. The residuals serve as interaction term (Lance, 1988). Orthogonalization
eliminates potential problems of multicollinearity that are often encountered in analyses of mod-
erating effects (Cronbach, 1987). It also facilitates interpretation of regression coefficients in that
single effects resulting from a regression with moderating effects strongly resemble main effects ob-
tained from a model without moderating effects (Lance, 1988). Hybrid refers to the fact that scores
for the interaction term are approximated in each iteration of the PLS algorithm (Henseler and
Chin, 2010), which is the original approach proposed by Wold (1982) to incorporate nonlinear ef-
fects into PLS path models. In contrast to other approaches (see Goodhue et al., 2007), the hybrid
approach does not capitalize on chance.
The model explains a substantial proportion of variance of the two dimensions of response strat-
egies. The R2 value of the constructive-destructive dimension (Dimension I) is .603, while the R2
value of the passive-active dimension (Dimension II) is .379, resulting in an average value of
.491. The bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (see Henseler et al., 2009) of the R2
values are (.435; .725) and (.208; .562), respectively.436 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
Figure 4. Explained variance of the discrete and continuous modelsThe results of the hypothesis testing are presented in Table 3. Alliance experience, as an individ-
ual factor, only had a significant effect on the constructiveedestructive dimension (b ¼ .184,
t ¼ 2.068). The significant radius in combination with an angle of 160 (p < .05 between
126197) supports the notion that high alliance experience mainly induces a constructive re-
sponse. Low alliance experience mainly induces a destructive response at an angle of 340
(p < .05 between 30617). The findings thus provide mixed support for Hypothesis 1, as the
effect of alliance experience only influences the constructiveedestructive dimension but not the
passiveeactive dimension. Figure 5a visualizes the confidence region of the effect of experience.
Exchange conditions, such as alliance factors, also influence a manager’s response strategy pref-
erence. Economic satisfaction only has a significant effect on the constructiveedestructive dimen-
sion (b ¼ .228, t ¼ 1.842). The significant radius in combination with an angle of 157 (p < .05
between 133 and 190) supports the notion that high economic satisfaction mainly induces a con-
structive response. Low economic satisfaction has an effect on destructive responses at an angle of
337 (p < .05 between 313 and 10). Hypothesis 2a is thus partially supported. Figure 5b shows the
confidence region of economic satisfaction. Social satisfaction does not exhibit any significant effect
on either of the two dimensions. However, effects between 188 and 244 are significant, which im-
plies that high social satisfaction positively influences preference for passiveeconstructive re-
sponses. Low social satisfaction induces activeedestructive responses between 8 and 64.
Hypothesis 2b is thus supported. Figure 5c visualizes the confidence region of social satisfaction.
Exit barriers have a significant effect on the passiveeactive dimension of response strategies
(b ¼ .266, t ¼ 2.072), in that the presence of exit barriers positively influences preferences for active
responses. The findings are inconclusive with regard to the influence on the constructi-
veedestructive dimension. The significant radius in combination with an angle of 79 (p < .05Long Range Planning, vol 45 2012 437
Table 3. Structural model results
Hyp. Independent Variable Discrete Analysis Continuous Analysis
Dimension I Dimension II Radius Anglea Angles between
which jtj > 1.645
Con-/Destructive Passive/Active
b t-valueb b t-value r t-value Min Max
H1a Alliance Experience .184 L2.068 .066 .597 .195 2.401 160  126  197 
H2a Economic Satisfaction .228 L1.842 .095 .605 .247 2.055 157  133  190 
H2b Social Satisfaction .190 1.447 .242 1.297 .307 2.074 232  188  244 
H2c Exit Barriers .054 .494 .266 2.072 .271 2.679 79  41  128 
H2d Available Alternatives .073 .716 .051 .456 .090 1.172 145  d d
H3a Environmental Turbulence .137 1.132 .016 .093 .138 1.400 353  d d
H3b Competitive Pressure .142 1.291 .122 .872 .187 2.065 319  305  347 
Environmental Turbulence  .
H4a Alliance Experience .116 1.196 .031 .241 .120 1.507 165  d d
H4b Economic Satisfaction .116 .844 .364 2.005 .382 2.481 72  30  123 
H4b Social Satisfaction .264 1.558 .231 1.026 .351 2.052 221  188  215 
H4c Exit Barriers .139 1.195 .239 1.537 .277 2.345 240  222  247 
Resource Complementarity .042 .288 .057 .303 .071 .556 233  d d
Controls Resource Complementarity .272 L2.156 .376 2.299 .464 4.354 126  74  187 
Competition between Partners .115 1.397 .092 .739 .148 1.794 141  141  169 
Age .036 .380 .024 .201 .043 .565 214  d d
Gender .050 .588 .096 .788 .109 1.249 242  d d
Social Desirability .037 .442 .006 .053 .038 .534 171  d d
a Angles represent the direction of the effect of the independent variable on the response strategy (that is, the consequence of a unit increase in an independent variable if the remaining independent
variables are kept constant). The consequence of a unit decrease in an independent variable can be obtained by adding or subtracting 180

from the angle.
b Values in bold are significant at 5%.
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Figure 5. Bootstrap-based confidence regionsbetween 41 and 128) supports the notion that high exit barriers induce an active response. Low
exit barriers have an effect on passive responses at an angle of 259 (p < .05 between 221 and
308). This provides support for Hypothesis 2c. Figure 5d depicts the confidence region of exit bar-
riers. Finally, the availability of alternatives does not influence any of the response strategy dimen-
sions, and its radius is not significantly different from zero. So Hypothesis 2d must be rejected.
The results provide mixed evidence for the role of environmental factors. The first factor, envi-
ronmental turbulence, does not have a significant direct effect on a manager’s response strategy.
Hypothesis 3a is therefore rejected. Competitive pressure does have a significant effect. Although
it does not influence any of the two identified response strategy dimensions in isolation, it shows
a significant effect if the coordinate system is rotated between 13 and 55 clockwise toward more
passiveedestructive responses. Low competitive pressure induces activeeconstructive responses,
between 193 and 235. Hypothesis 3b is supported. Figure 5a visualizes the confidence region
of the effect of competitive pressure.
We included the potential moderators, environmental turbulence and competitive pressure, se-
quentially into the structural model (see Table 3). This ensured a sensible ratio of observations per
independent variable. Competitive pressure turned out not to have any moderating effect at all, re-
jecting Hypothesis 5. For reasons of parsimony, the study eliminated the non-significant interac-
tions pertaining to competitive pressure from the analysis. While the results provide no support
for the moderating effect of environmental turbulence and alliance experience, thus rejecting Hy-
pothesis 4a, the results do provide evidence for the strengthening effect of environmental turbu-
lence on the relationship between economic satisfaction, social satisfaction and response strategy
preference. This supports Hypothesis 4b. In addition, environmental turbulence weakens the effectLong Range Planning, vol 45 2012 439
of exit barriers on response strategies, but not the effect of available alternatives (eliminated from
analysis). Thus, Hypothesis 4c is only partially supported.
Figure 6 graphically presents the model results, illustrating the single effects under the condition
of environmental turbulence. In case of less environmental turbulence, high economic satisfaction
is associated with a passiveeconstructive response and low economic satisfaction is associated with
an activeedestructive response, whereas environmental turbulence, economic satisfaction is associ-
ated with active (high) and passive (low) responses respectively. Social satisfaction has hardly any
influence in less turbulent environments, but in highly turbulent environments high social satisfac-
tion supports a passiveeconstructive response and low social satisfaction support an activee
destructive response. The effect of exit barriers is limited to low environmental turbulence. Only
then do high exit barriers stimulate active responses, whereas low exit barriers stimulate passive
responses.
Several control variables have a significant influence on the response strategies. All alliance-level
control variables are significant. Resource complementarity has a significant effect on the
constructive-destructive dimension (b ¼ .272, t ¼ 2.156) and the passive-active dimension
(b ¼ .376, t ¼ 2.299). The significant radius in combination with an angle of 126 (p < .05 between
74 and 187) supports the notion that high resource complementarity induces a constructive-
active response. Low resource complementarity, with an angle of 306 (p < .05 between 254
and 7), has an effect on passive-destructive responses. Competition between partners does not ex-
hibit any significant effect on either of the two dimensions. However, effects between 141 and 169
are significant, which implies that high competition makes active-constructive responses (p < .05
between 254 and 7) more likely, whereas low competition induces active-destructive responses.
The remaining individual control variables do not play any role. In line with Hair et al.’s (2012)
recommendations for the treatment of insignificant predictor variables, the researchers kept all con-
trol variables in the model.
Comparison of the explanatory power of the discrete and continuous models
In order to assess the incremental explanatory power of the continuous model compared to the dis-
crete model, we computed two reduced models. In the respective reduced models, to assess the con-
sequence of Type-II error, only significant antecedents are maintained. Figure 4 illustrates theFigure 6. Moderating effects of environmental turbulence
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capabilities of the reduced discrete model and the reduced continuous model to explain the vari-
ation in the plane of response strategies. The area of the ellipse representing the explained variance
of the continuous model is larger than the area of the ellipse representing the explained variance of
the discrete model. In order to test whether the continuous model explains significantly more var-
iance than the discrete model, we examined the difference in average adjusted R2 between the two
models. Bootstrapping with 5000 bootstrap samples revealed a significant difference (p ¼ .008) be-
tween the average adjusted R2 of the circumplex model (.402) and the average adjusted R2 of the
discrete model (.285). This result indicates that taking into account the circumplex structure of re-
sponse strategies reduces Type-II error.Discussion and conclusion
The objective of this study was twofold: to extend and apply PLS path modeling to handle circum-
plex structures, and to develop and test a model of alliance partners’ response strategies and key
antecedents, accounting for the circumplex structure of response strategies.
We demonstrate that it is both possible and worthwhile to model circumplex constructs with
PLS path modeling. Specifically, we show that by combining a hierarchical component structure
with deflation, it becomes possible to extract two dimensions that span a plane of response strat-
egies. Furthermore, we have enhanced PLS path modeling so that it can control the component
rotation during its runtime. With this enhancement, our proposed method avoids inflation of
the bootstrap standard errors by factor indeterminacy. We also can express the effects of poten-
tial antecedents in polar coordinates, which was necessary to specify the test of the antecedents
on the circumplex structure and reduce Type-II error. We introduced a new form of bootstrap-
based inference statistics when testing the effect of independent variables on a circumplex struc-
ture. By rotating the bootstrap path coefficients, we identified angles and significance regions for
which a particular independent variable would have a significant effect in the plain of response
strategies. In turn, we can obtain better specified tests and increased statistical power in the
model. Overall, we demonstrate not only that PLS path modeling can be extended to assess cir-
cumplex structures but also that it is useful in strategy research. In many conditions associated
with strategy studies (e.g., Swoboda et al., 2011) PLS is advantageous, including the relatively
small sample size in relation to the model’s complexity (i.e., number of variables and free pa-
rameters) and its focus on predicting strategy outcomes or firm behavior, rather than testing
or comparing theories.
The survey results highlight the importance of accounting for the circumplex structure in assessing
the effect of antecedents on response strategies. Had the analysis been limited to examining a discrete
model (see the four leftmost columns of Table 3), the results would have rejected four of seven effects,
similar to the findings of previous studies. Taking into account the circumplex structure by assessing the
polar coordinates of the hypothesized effects allowed us to reject only two of seven hypothesized rela-
tionships (i.e., alternative availability and environmental turbulence). This step reduced Type-II error
and increased the predictive power of the model. For example, when tested against the two dimensions,
the effect of social satisfaction was not significant (t ¼ 1.447, p > .05) on the first constructivee
destructive dimension, or on the second dimension (t ¼ 1.297, p > .05). However, after rotation,
the effect of social satisfaction became significant at 5%, between 188 and 244 (passiveeconstructive
strategies) for high social satisfaction and between 8 and 64 (activeedestructive strategies) for low so-
cial satisfaction. A comparison between the discrete model and the circumplex model in terms of ex-
planatory power corroborates this observation: Taking into account the circumplex structure of
response strategies when examining the effect of antecedents reduces Type-II error.
The results validate and extend prior response strategy research. Consistent with studies focusing
on alliance-level factors, the results demonstrate that exchange conditions influence response strat-
egy preference. In particular, as demonstrated by Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000), Ping (1999), and
Tjemkes and Furrer (2010), the results indicate that economic and social satisfaction and exit bar-
riers are significant predictors of response strategies. Contrary to findings by Hibbard et al. (2001),Long Range Planning, vol 45 2012 441
Ping (1993), and Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) though, we did not find any significant effect for avail-
able alternatives. This unexpected finding could be the result of a confounding effect with exit bar-
riers; some studies (e.g., Ping, 1999), consider a lack of alternatives as an exit barrier. The findings
also indicate that a manager’s alliance experience and competitive pressure directly affect response
strategy preference, whereas environmental turbulence moderates the effect of economic satisfac-
tion, social satisfaction, and exit barriers. This study thereby extends prior work that has focused
mainly on alliance factors (e.g., Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993; Tjemkes et al., 2012) by showing
the relative importance of individual, alliance and environmental factors in explaining response
strategy preferences.
We also extend prior response strategy research by demonstrating that variables discarded for
their lack of significance become significant when they are tested against the circumplex struc-
ture of response strategies. This recognition could explain some of the unexpected results of
prior response strategy studies. For example, Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) indicated that exit bar-
riers did not significantly influence response strategy preferences, whereas our current findings
indicate that exit barriers are associated with active responses. Furthermore, the model inte-
grates prior response strategy research, which has focused on a limited number of discrete re-
sponse strategies (e.g., Ping, 1997, 1999) or been limited to the empirical assessment of the
circumplex structure without relating it to antecedents (Furrer et al., 2012). Thus, the study
advances extant literature by presenting a response strategy model that provides a comprehen-
sive answer to the question of which factors affect alliance partners’ response behavior. In doing
so, we also contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of managers’ decision
making in strategic alliances, in contrast with extant alliance research that has focused mostly
on the consequences of such behavior (e.g., Ari~no and de la Torre, 1998; Park and Ungson,
2001).
From a managerial standpoint, a model of response strategies is critical because it enables
managers to allocate scarce resources efficiently in handling their alliances. Anticipating part-
ners’ behavior provides managers with early warning signals necessary to avoid a premature ter-
mination and provide firms with a competitive advantage (Ari~no and Doz, 2000). Compared
with models based on discrete response strategies, our model has two advantages. First, it shows
that managers take into account the integrated structure of response strategies when making de-
cisions rather than deciding on a response strategy in a piecemeal fashion. Second, the model
incorporates a larger set of levers (i.e., individual, alliance and environmental factors) that man-
agers can use to steer their alliance toward success and avoid premature termination. For exam-
ple, managers should recognize that if their partner is acting opportunistically, its economic
satisfaction is low and it has high exit barriers. Managers may then seek to increase partners’
economic satisfaction to trigger constructive responses, or let them exit the alliance by reducing
barriers. Thus, the model provides managers with deeper insights into an alliance partner’s ten-
dency to respond to distinct conditions and explicates the need to monitor changes in the pre-
dictors over time.
This study provides managers with two possible ways to anticipate an alliance partner’s behavior.
First, they can use the coefficients reported in Table 3. In combination with available levels of all
significant predictor variables, these coefficients yield the x and y coordinates of a response. Re-
sponse strategies closer to the predicted response strategy are more likely to be chosen (see
Table 2 for the polar coordinates of the seven response strategies). Second, they might use
Figure 5 to predict an alliance partner’s behavior in a graphical way. Depending on the level of en-
vironmental turbulence, managers should use Figure 5a or bd or, an adequate interpolation of the
two. The most likely response is obtained by concatenating the effects into one graph, and looking
up the response strategy that is closest to the resulting point.
As does all research, our empirical study has certain limitations. First, we measured behavioral
intentions, rather than actual behaviors, in an attempt to reduce recall and recency bias. Although
intentions are not always perfect predictors of behavior, this approach uses behavioral intentions as
early warning signals, so it seemed appropriate. When investigating actual behavior, it also could be442 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
useful to identify new interstitial response strategies, such as between patience and considerate
voice, which might further improve the validity of the circumplex structure. In addition, research
should investigate opportunism as a response strategy to disentangle how it deviates from the cir-
cumplex structure. A possible explanation might involve the presence of a third dimension, in
which six response strategies are perceived as neutral in their moral content, but opportunism is
not (Furrer et al., 2012).
Second, though the model includes three sets of factors, the inclusion of additional factors might
enhance the model’s explanatory power further. For example, additional research could incorporate
technological change at the environmental level, coordination mechanisms at the alliance level (see
Kashyap et al., 2012), and manager’s risk propensity at the individual level (see Tjemkes and Furrer,
2011). In addition, studies might draw on attribution theory to examine the potential effect of at-
tribution on response strategy preferences (Hibbard et al., 2001). Identifying the source of an ad-
versity also may affect a manager’s decision.
Third, in line with our hypotheses, we collected data by targeting a single respondent from one of
the alliance partners. However, gathering data from both sides of a relationship and contacting
multiple respondents within each partner firm would have enriched the study (Kumar et al.,
1993). For example, including partner behavior (Bello et al., 2010; Hibbard et al., 2001) into the
model likely would have increased its predictive power even further. Moreover, because strategic
alliance decisions are often made by a team of managers, response strategies might more reliably
be assessed using multiple respondents (Kumar et al., 1993).
Fourth, the cross-sectional nature of this study did not make it possible to assess time lags be-
tween response strategies. Building on work by Doz (1996) and Ari~no and de la Torre (1998), fur-
ther research should design more sophisticated longitudinal studies to examine changes in response
strategies over time.
Fifth and finally, we tested the model in the context of SMEs and focused on non-equity alliances.
Additional studies should test the model in the context of large firms and examine equity-based
alliances to enable the generalization of these findings across contexts.
This study extended PLS path modeling and tested a model of response strategies. The results
of the empirical part of the study demonstrate the relevance of conceptualizing the structure of
these response strategies as a circumplex. A key implication of modeling response strategies as
part of an integrated set of factors is that it provides a means to predict responses, anticipate
partner behavior, and manage alliances toward success. Consequently, the present study pro-
vides valuable guidelines for managers who are confronted with a need to respond to alliance
adversities.Appendix A. Operationalization of study constructs (Adapted from Tjemkes
and Furrer, 2010)Response
trategies
Description Item Standardized
Loading
xit The disinclination to continue
the current relationship
(Ping, 1993;
Rusbult et al., 1982)
Ex1: I will consider ending the
alliance with my partner.
.921
Ex2: I think I will probably stop
doing business with my partner.
.773
Ex3: I am not likely to continue
the alliance with my partner.
.859
Ex4: I intend to exit the alliance. (a) d
Ex5: I believe I will terminate
the alliance.
.944
(continued on next page)S
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Appendix A. (continued)
Response
Strategies
Description Item Standardized
Loading
Opportunism Self-interested behavior
that is explicitly or
implicitly prohibited
(Ping, 1993; Wathne
and Heide, 2000).
Op1: I will purposefully exaggerate
the situation in order to receive
additional benefits.
.791
Op2: I will change the facts slightly
in order to get what I need from
my partner.
.738
Op3: I will deliberately make the
situation sound more problematic
than it really is to obtain more
benefits from the alliance.
.779
Op4: In order to improve the
situation, I will try to avoid
certain contractual obligations.
.628
Op5: I will withhold important
information from my partner
to gain additional benefits.
.733
Op6: I will describe the situation
as negatively as possible to my
partner in order to gain
additional benefits.
.846
Aggressive voice A form of voice that consists
of efforts to win without
consideration for the concerns
of the exchange partner
(Hagedoorn et al., 1999).
Agr1: I will forcefully push my
firm’s solution to improve
the situation. (a)
d
Agr2: I will use my power to solve
situation in a way that suits my firm.
.690
Agr3: I will prove in all possible
ways to my partner that my firm’s
solution for the situation is right.
.747
Agr4: I will be very persistent with
my partner to have them accept my
firm’s solution to the situation.
.748
Agr5: I will strongly advocate my
firm’s solution to solve the situation
with the alliance.
.829
Creative voice A form of voice that consists
of the generation of novel
and potentially useful ideas
(Zhou and George, 2001).
Cre1: I will adopt a fresh approach
to improve the situation.
.739
Cre2: I will come up with new ideas
to improve the situation with the
alliance. (a)
d
Cre3: I will suggest constructive
changes to my partner to improve
the situation.
.640
Cre4: I will search for new and
innovative ideas to improve
the situation.
.736
Cre5: I will propose creative solutions
to my partner to improve the situation.
.842
Cre6: I will suggest new creative ways
to improve the situation.
.816
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Appendix A. (continued )
Response
Strategies
Description Item Standardized
Loading
Considerate voice A form of voice that consists
of attempts to solve the
situation by considering one’s
own concerns as well as those
of the partner (Ping, 1993).
Con1: I will try to reaching an
understanding with my partner to
solve the situation.
.846
Con2: I will work to create a consensus
with my partner to solve the situation.
.796
Con3: I will approach my partner with
a proposition to solve the situation
and work it out together. (a)
d
Con4: In collaboration with my partner,
I will try to find a solution that is
satisfactory to everyone.
.700
Con5: I will contact my partner to find
an acceptable solution for both partners.
.847
Con6: I will talk to my partner to find
a mutual satisfactory solution to
improve the situation.
.900
Patience Abiding relationship issues in
silence with the confidence
that things will get better
(Hagedoorn et al., 1999;
Ping, 1993)
Pat1: I trust the situation will solve itself. .835
Pat2: I will not say anything to my
partner because I expect the situation
to go away by itself.
.711
Pat3: I will wait optimistically for
better times.
.746
Pat4: I will wait patiently and hope the
situation solves itself.
.662
Pat5: I expect that soon everything will
work out with the alliance.
.780
Pat6: I am confident that in the end the
situation will be resolved.
.772
Neglect Passively allowing the
relationship to deteriorate
(Ping, 1993; Rusbult et al.,
1982)
Neg1: I do not plan anything extra to
solve the situation with the alliance. (a)
d
Neg2: I will not initiate anything to
improve the situation with the
alliance. (a)
d
Neg3: I will passively let the alliance
with my partner end.
.594
Neg4: I will not deal with the situation
with the alliance.
.693
Neg5: I do not intend to invest anymore
in the alliance with my partner to
solve the situation.
.728
Neg6: I do not intent to put any effort
into the alliance to improve the situation
.804
a Excluded from data analysis.
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Appendix B. Hierarchical component model of response strategiesAppendix C. Covariance-based circumplex models
The table below provides a model comparison based on the results of maximum-likelihood covari-
ance-based structural equation modeling (as implemented in AMOS 19). The model is estimated
relying on the latent variable scores as obtained through PLS path modeling. We estimated three
models with regard to the dimensionality of the seven response strategies (see Perrinjaquet et al.,
2007). Model 1 postulates a discrete two-dimensional structure of the seven response strategies.
Model 2 postulates a continuous circumplex structure, which means that two factors can explain
the seven response strategies such that the R2 values of all response strategies are equal. Model 3
postulates a circumplex model in which the equality constraint was released for the radius of
opportunism. Model 2 is nested in Model 3, and Model 3 is nested in Model 1. Since the latent
variable scores cannot assumed to be normal distributed (Goodhue et al., 2006), we use the
Bollen-Stine bootstrap (Bollen and Stine, 1992) as test of exact fit. The results show that Model
2 poorly fits the data, Model 1 has the highest absolute fit, and Model 3 excels with regard to
parsimony-adjusted fit. As Model 3 is more parsimonious, these results support a circumplex struc-
ture confirming PLS results.446 A Model of Response Strategies in Strategic Alliances
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Structure
Dimensionality Discrete
two-dimensional
Circumplex 1 Circumplex 2
Degrees of freedom 123.000 117.000 118.000
Minimum discrepancy (Fmin) 1.087 1.342 1.240
Bollen-Stine bootstrap p-value
(with 1000 resamples)
.108 .044 .077
Goodness of fit index (GFI) .901 .881 .890
Parsimony-adjusted goodness
of fit index (PGFI)
.318 .338 .337
Comparative fit index (CFI) .910 .870 .888
Parsimony-adjusted comparative
fit index (PCFI)
.356 .371 .374
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 360.162 374.953 366.154
Browne-Cudeck criterion (BCC) 418.044 430.012 421.684
Bayes information criterion (BIC) 687.765 686.575 680.440
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 810.765 803.575 798.440
Standardized root mean square
residual (SRMR)
.053 .052 .051References
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